<P>In cognitive science, conceptual content is frequently understood as the"meaning" of a mental representation. This position raises largely empirical questionsabout what concepts are, what form they take in mental processes, and how they connect to the worldthey are about. In <I>Minds without Meaning</I>, Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn reviewsome of the proposals put forward to answer these questions and find that none of them is remotelydefensible. Fodor and Pylyshyn determine that all of these proposals share a commitment to atwo-factor theory of conceptual content, which holds that the content of a concept consists of itssense together with its reference. Fodor and Pylyshyn argue instead that there is no conclusive caseagainst the possibility of a theory of concepts that takes reference as their sole semanticproperty. Such a theory, if correct, would provide for the naturalistic account of content thatcognitive science lacks -- and badly needs. Fodor and Pylyshyn offer a sketch of how this theorymight be developed into an account of perceptual reference that is broadly compatible with empiricalfindings and with the view that the mental processes effecting perceptual reference are largelypreconceptual, modular, and encapsulated. </P>