<P>The Chernobyl disaster has been variously ascribed to human error, reactor designflaws, and industry mismanagement. Six former Chernobyl employees were convicted of criminalnegligence; they defended themselves by pointing to reactor design issues. Other observers blamedthe Soviet style of ideologically driven economic and industrial management. In <I>ProducingPower,</I> Sonja Schmid draws on interviews with veterans of the Soviet nuclear industry andextensive research in Russian archives as she examines these alternate accounts. Rather than pursueone "definitive" explanation, she investigates how each of these narratives makes sense inits own way and demonstrates that each implies adherence to a particular set of ideas -- abouthigh-risk technologies, human-machine interactions, organizational methods for ensuring safety andproductivity, and even about the legitimacy of the Soviet state. She also shows how these attitudesshaped, and were shaped by, the Soviet nuclear industry from its verybeginnings.</P><P>Schmid explains that Soviet experts established nuclear power as adriving force of social, not just technical, progress. She examines the Soviet nuclear industry'sdual origins in weapons and electrification programs, and she traces the emergence of nuclear powerexperts as a professional community. Schmid also fundamentally reassesses the design choices fornuclear power reactors in the shadow of the Cold War's arms race. </P><P>Schmid'saccount helps us understand how and why a complex sociotechnical system broke down. Chernobyl, whileunique and specific to the Soviet experience, can also provide valuable lessons for contemporarynuclear projects.</P>