The famine that spread among the Dinka people of Sudan in 1985-1989 was of benefit to those at the local level and in the central government who were able and permitted to manipulate famine relief for their own purposes. So argues Keen (London School of Economics, UK), who examines the causes of the famine, conceiving of it as an extended economic and political process, which leads to a focus on the political and economic incentives for withholding relief among a complex group of actors. He finds the famine to have been caused by the combination of loss of assets and production (primarily because of raiding) among the politically powerless Dinka; the failure of market strategies; the failure of nonmarket survival strategies; and the inadequacy of relief--all processes that yielded benefits for a loose and shifting coalition of politically powerful groups within Sudan, who helped promote these processes. This paperbound edition includes a new introduction placing the current crisis in Darfur and other more recent events within the context of the analytical framework of the earlier study. Annotation ©2009 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)