<P>Imagining<BR>A Phenomenological Study<BR>Second Edition<BR>Edward S. Casey</P><P>A classic firsthand account of the lived character of imaginative experience.</P><P>"This scrupulous, lucid study is destined to become a touchstone for all future writings on imagination." —Library Journal</P><P>"Casey's work is doubly valuable—for its major substantive contribution to our understanding of a significant mental activity, as well as for its exemplary presentation of the method of phenomenological analysis." —Contemporary Psychology</P><P>"... an important addition to phenomenological philosophy and to the humanities generally." —Choice</P><P>"... deliberately and consistently phenomenological, oriented throughout to the basically intentional character of experience and disciplined by the requirement of proceeding by way of concrete description.... [Imagining] is an exceptionally well-written work." —International Philosophical Quarterly</P><P>Drawing on his own experiences of imagining, Edward S. Casey describes the essential forms that imagination assumes in everyday life. In a detailed analysis of the fundamental features of all imaginative experience, Casey shows imagining to be eidetically distinct from perceiving and defines it as a radically autonomous act, involving a characteristic freedom of mind. A new preface places Imagining within the context of current issues in philosophy and psychology.</P><P>[use one Casey bio for both Imagining and Remembering]<BR>Edward S. Casey is Professor of Philosophy at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. He is author of Getting Back into Place: Toward a Renewed Understanding of the Place-World (Indiana University Press) and The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History.</P><P>Studies in Continental Thought—John Sallis, general editor</P><P>Contents<BR>Preface to the Second Edition<BR>Introduction The Problematic Place of Imagination<BR>Part One: Preliminary Portrait<BR>Examples and First Approximations<BR>Imagining as Intentional<BR>Part Two Detailed Descriptions<BR>Spontaneity and Controlledness<BR>Self-Containedness and Self-Evidence<BR>Indeterminacy and Pure Possibility<BR>Part Three: Phenomenological Comparisons<BR>Imagining and Perceiving: Continuities<BR>Imagining and Perceiving: Discontinuities<BR>Part Four: The Autonomy of Imagining<BR>The Nature of Imaginative Autonomy<BR>The Significance of Imaginative Autonomy</P>