<div>In <i>Law and Public Choice</i>, Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey present a remarkably rich <br>and accessible introduction to the driving principles of public choice. In this, the first <br>systematic look at the implications of social choice for legal doctrine, Farber and Frickey <br>carefully review both the empirical and theoretical literature about interest group influence and <br>provide a nonmathematical introduction to formal models of legislative action. Ideal for course <br>use, this volume offers a balanced and perceptive analysis and critique of an approach which, <br>within limits, can illuminate the dynamics of government decision-making. <br>“<i>Law and Public Choice</i> is a most valuable contribution to the burgeoning literature. It <br>should be of great interest to lawyers, political scientists, and all others interested in issues at <br>the intersection of government and law.”--Cass R. Sunstein, University of Chicago Law <br>School <br><br><br></div>