The concept of virtue is central in both contemporary ethics and epistemology. In contrast, in law, there has not been a comparable trend toward explaining normativity on the model of virtue theory. In the last few years, however, there has been an increasing interest in virtue theory among legal scholars. 'Virtue jurisprudence' has emerged as a serious candidate for a theory of law and adjudication. Advocates of virtue jurisprudence put primary emphasis on aretaic concepts, rather than on duties or consequences. Aretaic concepts are, on this view, crucial for explaining law and adjudication. This book contains a collection of essays examining the role of virtue in general jurisprudence, as well as in specific areas of the law. The contributions are written by international experts in the field. Part I of the book brings together a number of papers discussing various philosophical aspects of an approach to law and adjudication based on the virtues. Part II discusses the relationship between law, virtue, and character development. Critically, the select essays analyze this relationship by combining both Eastern perspectives on virtue and character with Western approaches. Parts III and IV examine problems of substantive areas of law - more specifically, criminal law and evidence law - from within a virtue-based framework. Finally, Part V discusses the relevance of empathy to our understanding of justice and legal morality. (Series: Law and Practical Reason - Vol. 5)