<P>"How do mental errors or cognitive biases undermine good decision making?" This is the question Steve A. Yetiv takes up in his latest foreign policy study, <I>National Security through a Cockeyed Lens</I>.</P><P>Yetiv draws on four decades of psychological, historical, and political science research on cognitive biases to illuminate some of the key pitfalls in our leaders’ decision-making processes and some of the mental errors we make in perceiving ourselves and the world.</P><P>Tracing five U.S. national security episodes—the 1979 Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan; the Iran-Contra affair during the Reagan administration; the rise of al-Qaeda, leading to the 9/11 attacks; the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq; and the development of U.S. energy policy—Yetiv reveals how a dozen cognitive biases have been more influential in impacting U.S. national security than commonly believed or understood. </P><P>Identifying a primary bias in each episode—disconnect of perception versus reality; tunnel vision ("focus feature"); distorted perception ("cockeyed lens"); overconfidence; and short-term thinking—Yetiv explains how each bias drove the decision-making process and what the outcomes were for the various actors. His concluding chapter examines a range of debiasing techniques, exploring how they can improve decision making.</P><P>"Provides a multiperspective approach that can enrich and enlighten readers' knowledge of foreign policy decisions."— <I>Choice</I>, reviewing <I>Explaining Foreign Policy</P><P></I>"Whether or not <I>Explaining Foreign Policy</I> ultimately takes its place beside <I>Essence of Decision</I> as a seminal work in the field, the book serves the same function in challenging analysts to question conventional models and accommodate complexity in the scholarly study of foreign policy."— <I>Perspectives on Politics</I>, reviewing <I>Explaining Foreign Policy</I></P>