French leader Charles de Gaulle's Cold War foreign policy has variously been portrayed as irrational and guided mainly by anti-US prejudice by some and by others as merely anti-hegemonic. Additionally, scholars have debated the extent to which de Gaulle's foreign policy was guided by some grand design, and if so, what the goals of his plans were and whether they were achievable. Martin (European Institute, Washington, DC) tackles all of these questions in his analysis of de Gaulle's foreign policy, arguing first that, while de Gaulle was not guided by anti-American hostility, the goal of countering US power became increasingly central to his policies during the 1960s. Secondly, connecting France's policies towards its Western allies with its opening to the Eastern bloc and describing the close ties between France's security and monetary policies, he argues that one can identify a Gaullist grand design that was aimed at recapturing great power status for France and overcoming the bipolar Cold War order. These goals, he further argues, were not quixotic, although de Gaulle did make important mistakes that prevented the realization of his diplomatic agenda. Annotation ©2013 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)