<P>The computer analogy of the mind has been as widely adopted in contemporary cognitiveneuroscience as was the analogy of the brain as a collection of organs in phrenology. Just as thephrenologist would insist that each organ must have its particular function, so contemporarycognitive neuroscience is committed to the notion that each brain region must have its fundamentalcomputation. In <I>After Phrenology</I>, Michael Anderson argues that to achieve a fullypost-phrenological science of the brain, we need to reassess this commitment and devise analternate, neuroscientifically grounded taxonomy of mental function. </P><P>Andersoncontends that the cognitive roles played by each region of the brain are highly various, reflectingdifferent neural partnerships established under different circumstances. He proposes quantifying thefunctional properties of neural assemblies in terms of their dispositional tendencies rather thantheir computational or information-processing operations. Exploring larger-scale issues, and drawingon evidence from embodied cognition, Anderson develops a picture of thinking rooted in theexploitation and extension of our early-evolving capacity for iterated interaction with the world.He argues that the multidimensional approach to the brain he describes offers a much better fit forthese findings, and a more promising road toward a unified science of minded organisms.</P>