This book on Islamist insurgency came from an unusual set of circumstances. The author is a Muslim, a high-ranking officer in the Indonesia National Police, and a PhD. As he was beginning dissertation research, he was returned to duty in a counterterrorism unit of the INP in the wake of two hotel bombings in Jakarta by the insurgent group Al-Jamaah al-Islamiyyah (JI) in 2009. He divided his time between participating in the counterterrorism investigation as a paramilitary police officer and investigating the sources of the problem as a PhD researcher. He was promoted to Brigadier General, which gave him full access to security documents. This book is the result. It attempts to answer the question of why some insurgent groups become involved in terrorism, while others with similar backgrounds, faiths, and politics do not. The book identifies three causal factors in this case study that moved people from insurgency to terrorism: disaffected individuals, an enabling group, and a legitimizing ideology (Salifi-jihadism) for using violence in the name of religion, which could then be interpreted to get around religious prohibitions against violence-against other Muslims, in peacetime, and against civilians. The book ends with two chapters on the radicalization process of Muslims in Poso, Indonesia, and conclusions and policy implications in the view of the author. He recommends that future studies use communication theory as a tool to understand how Islamist radicalization works. The book is recommended for military and criminal justice students and professionals, as well as students and professionals in communication, who have an interest in questions of Islamism and terrorism. Annotation ©2014 Ringgold, Inc., Portland, OR (protoview.com)